Cryptographic Primitives and Quantum Theory

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Abstract

This paper summarizes the current knowledge in the field of two-party cryptographic protocols devised from quantum systems. We introduce the reader to the notion of cryptographic protocols and describe a number of simple building blocks to achieve them. We also give pointers for the reader who is interested to the quantum implementation of these building blocks.

1 Introduction

Since the 1970's the science of secret writing, cryptography, has changed substantially due to the introduction of "public key cryptosystems" [26, 41]. The many properties of certain instances of these systems have open the door to several new applications (consult [42, 25, 29, 44, 34, 28, 7, 30, 36, 32, 11, 19, 33] for instance, to mention just a few). The initial goal of cryptography, to provide secure communications, has evolved into a variety of tasks involving secret data.

The scenario in which such tasks take place involves two participants (say Alice and Bob) who wish to perform some computation involving data they want to keep secret from one another. We call the solutions to such tasks "cryptographic protocols". An implementation of such a protocol is *secure* if a participant acting maliciously in any possible way he wishes cannot obtain more information about the other party's secret than what is described in the task's specification.

This paper introduces the reader to a number of cryptographic *primitives* used as building blocks to construct secure cryptographic protocols. It also contains pointers to a wide literature demonstrating how such building blocks can be implemented securely, not only using public key cryptography, but using quantum mechanics as a support.

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2 Cryptographic Primitives

We now introduce the main two basic primitives that have been widely considered as useful building blocks in the design of more elaborate cryptographic protocols:

Bit commitment: Alice can commit to the value of a bit b in such a way that Bob has no information about which bit it is, yet Alice can only open the commitment to show the original bit b and not the opposite $\neg b$.

Oblivious transfer: Alice can send a bit b to Bob in such a way that the bit is received with probability 50%. Neither party can influence the probability that the bit is received. Alice obtains no information as to whether the transfer was successful, while Bob finds out with certainty.

Each of these two tasks have been first introduced in public-key cryptographic models and several results apply to them independently of their implementation. We now expand a little bit about each of them, their significance, and their quantum implementations.

2.1 Bit commitment

This primitive can be implicitly traced back to very early public-key cryptography papers [40, 42]. It as been used for **coin tossing protocols** (Alice and Bob who do not trust each other want to toss a coin over a telephone line) [8, 9, 2], **zero-knowledge proofs** (Alice wants to prove the validity of a statement to Bob without revealing him anything else than the fact that the statement is true) [35, 36, 12, 11, 32, 16, 10, 38], and more or less every single cryptographic protocol

involves bit commitments somewhere. It is a very fundamental primitive.

In terms of quantum implementation, an early protocol to achieve this task was given implicitly in [2]: Bennett and Brassard gave a coin tossing protocol using faint pulses of polarized light which implicitly used bit commitment. Unfortunately, as explained in the same paper, their scheme can be defeated using pairs of entangled photons such as those suggested by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen [27].

A later scheme [13], did not suffer from this attack. This time the possible flaw is linked to the assumption that photons are read individually. Although it was left as an open question in that paper, recent work with Richard Jozsa, Gilles Brassard and my student Denis Langlois indicates that general Positive Operator Measurements (POMs) will not have any impact on the security of this protocol. A realistic protocol which takes into account the parameters of the real prototype of the apparatus build by Bennett, Bessette, Brassard, Salvail and Smolin [5] can be deduced by the techniques used in [4] and [6].

2.2 Oblivious Transfer

A protocol with a flavour similar to Oblivious Transfer, called *multiplexing channel* by Wiesner [43], was one of the early applications of quantum mechanics for cryptography. Wiesner invented this protocol in the early 1970's, long before the cryptographers even realized the significance of this work. The Oblivious Transfer as described earlier is due to Rabin [40]. It has been used in the design of several more complicated protocols [8, 9, 40]. More formally correct versions of this protocol were later given by Fischer, Micali, and Rackoff in [30] and by Berger, Peralta and Tedrick in [7]. Other similar protocols were in the meanwhile introduced: Even, Goldreich and Lempel's *one-out-of-two oblivious transfer* [29] (which is more or less a stronger formal version of Wiesner's multiplexing) and All-or-Nothing Disclosure of Secrets (a generalization of one-out-of-two oblivious transfer) of Brassard, Crépeau and Robert [15].

All these different tasks were shown equivalent: any one of them can be implemented securely starting with a secure protocol of any other one of them [14, 20, 24, 23, 21]. In particular, any of these protocols can be used to achieve the following very general task [44, 33, 17, 39, 22]

Secure two party computation: Consider a two-parameter polynomial-time computable function f. One party knows input x and the other party knows input y. The protocol allows both parties to compute $f(x, y)$ without disclosing any information to either party about the other party's secret input, except of course for what can be inferred from knowledge of one's secret input and of the final output.

A large number of protocols can be described as an instance of secure two party computation. An example of this is Yao's "millionaire problem" [44]: Alice and Bob want to figure out which one of them is the richest without disclosing the value of their fortune to one another. Another example is what Damgård calls "the dating problem" [17]: Alice and Bob want to decide whether they are compatible for a date without revealing to each other the criterions according to which they would select a partner (for obvious reasons sometimes); they should find out nothing about their mutual tastes except for the fact that they were not compatible in the case were the protocol answers in that direction. Also, the widely studied "mental poker" problem [42, 34, 31, 1, 45, 18, 19, 33]: Alice and Bob want to play a fair game of poker in a setting where they cannot meet and exchange physical cards.

More seriously, a simple identification system can be set up as a particular case of the secure two party computation with the function f taken to be the boolean predicate $x = y$. This would enable two parties to check that they know a common identification string without disclosing any extra information in the case were they did not agree.

In the quantum world, several papers have suggested possible implementations of primitives equivalent to Oblivious Transfer, starting with Wiesner's paper [43]. Indeed the first published quantum solution to this problem was [3] (although Wiesner's original idea was conceived at least ten years before). Neither of these two protocols satisfied very strong security criteria. Recent work of Bennett and myself indicates that trivial extensions of these protocols might fulfill the strong security definitions. The result of this research has been rather disappointing since at least in the case of [3] this approach was shown insecure, while in the case of [43] it is still not clear if the new approach leads to a secure protocol or not.

More recently, a theoretical implementation of the one-out-of-two Oblivious Transfer was proposed in [23], but was totally useless in a realistic scenario were errors could occur during the quantum transmission.

A more complete description of that work and more thorough proofs may be found in [21].

Finally, joint work of myself with Bennett and Brassard, together with my student Marie-Hélène Skubiszewska, has led to a practical solution as explained in [6]. At this stage, the solution we have described has been experimentally exploited with the quantum prototype of [5]. Unfortunately, the error rate of the current apparatus is too high for the capabilities of our protocol. A new experiment is being set up with more accurate photodetectors.

3 Research Avenues

The main line of research that is currently being investigated concerning this work is the determination of the power of POMs as attacking tools against these systems. As mentioned above, work of Jozsa, myself, Brassard and Langlois (based on the wonderful book of Carl W. Helstrom [37]) seems to indicate that the protocols of [23, 13, 6] are safe even when Alice and Bob are allowed to attack them with POMs, but there is still a long way to go before absolute security of our solutions is proved.

Another line of research we are currently investigating is the possibility of implementing directly high level protocols such as the "x=y" primitive using quantum properties. Until now, it has been necessary to rely on several levels of *reductions* to transform the quantum transfer into something useful. This process is extremely costly and impractical.

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