Introduction to theoretical quantum CRYPTOGRAPHY

Claude Crépeau

School of Computer Science
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(4)

two-party Cryptographic Protocols

BIT COMMITMENT



COMMIT

UNVEIL



BIT COMMITMENT



CONCEALING

BINDING





Oblivious Transfer (message multiplexing)







Oblivious Transfer



Oblivious Transfer





Bc

C

1/2-OT

C



Oblivious Function Evaluation







Mutual Identification





Classically



Trapdoor
One-way
Permutation

One-way
Function



Quantumly



Classically (information theoretical)



Folklore

Quantumly (information theoretical)



Mayers, Lo-Chau

Non-Locality Box

$$a \oplus b = x \barwedge y$$



C: 3/4 Q: $\cos^2(\pi/8) \approx 85\%$

Quantumly



Oblivious
Transfer
(message multiplexing)





Oblivious
Function
Evaluation





Non-Locality Box



1) Wolf,Wullschleger ?
2) Short,Gisin,Popescu
3) Buhrman,Christandl,
Unger,Wehner,Winter

(5)

Quantum Oblivious Transfer



Oblivious Transfer (message multiplexing)





Q-OT



b_0 b_1



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	×	+	×	+	+	+	×	×	×	×	+	+	+	+	×	×	×	+	×	+	+	+	×	+
B:	×	×	+	+	×	+	+	+	×	+	+	×	×	×	+	×	×	×	+	+	×	+	×	+
	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
A:	×	+	×	+	+	+	×	×	×	×	+	+	+	+	×	×	×	+	×	+	+	+	×	+
B:	0			0		1			1		0					1	0			1		0	0	0
B:	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0													
A:	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
B:	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	=	0							=							
A:	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	=	0						0	=	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
A:										⊕ b_0 ⊕							⊕ b_1 ⊕								
B:									b_0	=	0						=								

Crépeau-Kilian

Q-OT



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

A:	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0
	×	+	×	+	+	+	×	×	×	×	+	+	+	+	×	×	×	+	×	+	+	+	×	+

Q-OT



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

A:	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0
	×	+	×	+	+	+	×	×	×	×	+	+	+	+	×	×	×	+	×	+	+	+	×	+
B:	×	×	+	+	×	+	+	+	×	+	+	×	×	×	+	×	×	×	+	+	×	+	×	+
	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0

Q-OT



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

A:	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0
	×	+	×	+	+	+	×	×	×	×	+	+	+	+	×	×	×	+	×	+	+	+	×	+
B:	×	×	+	+	×	+	+	+	×	+	+	×	×	×	+	×	×	×	+	+	×	+	×	+
	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
A:	×	+	×	+	+	+	×	×	×	×	+	+	+	+	×	×	×	+	×	+	+	+	×	+

Q-OT



b_0 b_1



B:	×	×	+	+	×	+	+	+	×	+	+	×	×	×	+	×	×	×	+	+	×	+	×	+
	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
A:	×	+	×	+	+	+	×	×	×	×	+	+	+	+	×	×	×	+	×	+	+	+	×	+
B:	0			0		1			1		0				1	0			1		0	0	0	

Q-OT



b_0 b_1



A: 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0

B: 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0

B: 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0

A: 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1

Oblivious Transfer







Q-OT



b_0 b_1



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A:	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
B:	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	=	0					=				
A:	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	=	0				0	=	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1

Q-OT



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





Oblivious Transfer



Q-OT



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

A: 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0

× + × + + + × × × × + + + + × × × + × + + + × +

A: × + × + + + × × × × + + + + × × × + × + + + × +

B: × + × + + + × × × × + + + + × × × + × + × + × +

0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0

B: 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 = 0 0 = 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1

A: 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 = 0 0 = 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1

$\oplus$ b_0 $\oplus$ b_1

A:

B: b_0 = 0 0 = b_1



Oblivious Transfer



Q-OT from Q-BC



b_0 b_1





Q-OT from Q-BC



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

A:	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0
	×	+	×	+	+	+	×	×	×	×	+	+	+	+	×	×	×	+	×	+	+	+	×	+
B:	×	×	+	+	×	+	+	+	×	+	+	×	×	×	+	×	×	×	+	+	×	+	×	+
	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0

Q-OT from Q-BC



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



Q-OT from Q-BC



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



Q-OT from Q-BC



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



Q-OT



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

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	×	+	×	+	+	+	×	×	×	×	+	+	+	+	×	×	×	+	×	+	+	+	×	+
B:	×	×	+	+	×	+	+	+	×	+	+	×	×	×	+	×	×	×	+	+	×	+	×	+
	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
A:	×	+	×	+	+	+	×	×	×	×	+	+	+	+	×	×	×	+	×	+	+	+	×	+
B:	0	↵	↵	0	↵	1	↵	↵	1	↵	0	↵	↵	↵	↵	1	0	↵	↵	1	↵	0	0	0

(6)

two provers

Cryptographic Protocols

Classically



BGKW88

Classically



Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Kilian, Wigderson

b

$z = x$ if $b = 0$

$z = x \oplus y$ if $b = 1$



y

z

x



$x \oplus z = b \cdot y$?

Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Kilian, Wigderson

$x_0 \oplus z = 0 \cdot y = 0$

$x_1 \oplus z = 1 \cdot y = y$

$x_0 \oplus x_1 = (x_0 \oplus z) \oplus (x_1 \oplus z) = y$

possible with prob. at most 2^{-n}



x_0

x_1



Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Kilian, Wigderson

Classically



y

z

y z

NL

b x



x



$x \oplus z = b \cdot y$

Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Kilian, Wigderson

Quantumly



or



???

(7)

two provers BC

Classically Secure

Quantumly Insecure

Quantumly



Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Kilian, Wigderson

b

$z = x$ if $b = 0$

$z = x \oplus y$ if $b = 1$



y

z

x



$D_H(x \oplus z, b \cdot y) < n/5$?

Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Kilian, Wigderson

Classically



y

z

75% NL -> $D_H(x \oplus z, b \cdot y) \approx 25\% n > n/5$



x



$D_H(x \oplus z, b \cdot y) < n/5$?

Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Kilian, Wigderson

Quantumly



y

z

y z

≈85% NL -> $D_H(x \oplus z, b \cdot y) \approx 15\% n < n/5$

b x



x



$D_H(x \oplus z, b \cdot y) < n/5$?

~~Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Kilian, Wigderson~~

Classically

$D_H(x_0 \oplus z, 0 \cdot y) = D_H(x_0 \oplus z, 0) < n/5$

$D_H(x_1 \oplus z, 1 \cdot y) = D_H(x_1 \oplus z, y) < n/5$

$D_H(x_0 \oplus x_1, y) = D_H((x_0 \oplus z) \oplus (x_1 \oplus z), y) < 2n/5 < n/2$

possible with prob. at most c^{-n}

Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Kilian, Wigderson

Quantumly



Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Kilian, Wigderson

(8)

two provers BC Classically and Quantumly Secure

$$z = x \oplus r_b$$

b



r_0, r_1

z

x



$x = z \oplus r_b$?

modified BGKW

Classically

$x_0 \oplus z = r_0$

$x_1 \oplus z = r_1$

$x_0 \oplus x_1 = (x_0 \oplus z) \oplus (x_1 \oplus z) = r_0 \oplus r_1$

possible with prob. at most 2^{-n}



x_0

x_1



modified BGKW

Quantumly



Quantumly

MAIN THEOREM

Let **Z** and **O** be POVMs such that outputs x_0 and x_1 one could obtain by applying one of them to the state shared among the two provers.

Suppose the success probability of unveiling is
$$p_0+p_1 > 1+\delta,$$
then the (prediction probability of $y_0 \oplus y_1$) $> \delta$.

This prediction probability is achieved by first applying **Z** to the shared state followed by **O** on the leftover system or the other way around.

Imagine that Peggy and Paula would like to be able to unveil a certain instance of b both as 0 and as 1. Our only assumption is that Paula knows nothing about r_0, r_1. Let them share an unlimited quantity of entanglement in any form they wish. Without loss of generality to unveil a zero the message of Paula is defined by the outcome w_0 of a POVM $\mathbb{Z} = \{Z_1^\dagger Z_1, \cdots, Z_{2^n}^\dagger Z_{2^n}\}$ and to unveil a 1 by the outcome w_1 of a POVM $\mathbb{O} = \{O_1^\dagger O_1, \cdots, O_{2^n}^\dagger O_{2^n}\}$.

Each operator in a POVM is a positive matrix and can thus be decomposed into a linear combination of orthogonal projectors with coefficients between 0 and 1.

Let p_0 be the probability of successfully unveiling 0 and p_1 be the probability of successfully unveiling 1. Suppose there exists a pair of POVMs where $p_0 + p_1 > 1$. We show that any quantum player can then obtain *both* classical strings w_0, w_1 to unveil both values with probability strictly greater than zero. Notice that if we manage to make the probability of getting both strings w_0, w_1 greater than $1/2^n$, then Paula can compute $r_0 \oplus r_1 = w_0 \oplus w_1$ better than at random. This implies communication between Peggy and Paula, which is impossible by hypothesis.

The strategy of Paula is simply to perform both measurements, one after the other. Let's denote her state by ρ. Assume the right outcome for unveiling a zero is w_0 and the right outcome for unveiling a one is w_1.

The probability to obtain w_0 if $\mathbb{Z}$ is measured is

$$p_0 = Tr(Z_{w_0}^\dagger Z_{w_0} \rho)$$

and the state becomes

$$Z_{w_0} \rho Z_{w_0}^\dagger / p_0.$$

The probability to obtain w_1 if $\mathbb{O}$ is measured is

$$p_1 = Tr(O_{w_1}^\dagger O_{w_1} \rho)$$

and the state becomes

$$O_{w_1} \rho O_{w_1}^\dagger / p_1.$$

If $\mathbb{O}$ is measured after $\mathbb{Z}$ the probability to obtain w_0 and w_1 is given by

$$p_{01} \;=\; p_0 Tr[O_{w_1}^\dagger O_{w_1} Z_{w_0} \rho Z_{w_0}^\dagger / p_0] \;=\; Tr[O_{w_1}^\dagger O_{w_1} Z_{w_0} \rho Z_{w_0}^\dagger]$$

If $\mathbb{Z}$ is measured after $\mathbb{O}$ the probability to obtain w_1 and w_0 is given by

$$p_{10} \;=\; p_1 Tr[Z_{w_1}^\dagger Z_{w_1} O_{w_0} \rho O_{w_0}^\dagger / p_1] \;=\; Tr[Z_{w_1}^\dagger Z_{w_1} O_{w_0} \rho O_{w_0}^\dagger]$$

Both p_{01} and p_{10} must be smaller or equal to $1/2^n$ otherwise Paula learns something about $r_0 \oplus r_1 = w_0 \oplus w_1$ (which is impossible without communication).

Having all this in mind, consider the following sequence of implications:

$$
\begin{aligned}
p_{01} + p_{10} &\leq 1/2^{n-1} \\
Tr[O_{w_1}^\dagger O_{w_1} Z_{w_0} \rho Z_{w_0}^\dagger] + Tr[Z_{w_1}^\dagger Z_{w_1} O_{w_0} \rho O_{w_0}^\dagger] &\leq 1/2^{n-1} \\
Tr[(I - (I - O_{w_1}^\dagger O_{w_1}))Z_{w_0} \rho Z_{w_0}^\dagger] + Tr[(I - (I - Z_{w_1}^\dagger Z_{w_1}))O_{w_0} \rho O_{w_0}^\dagger] &\leq 1/2^{n-1} \\
Tr[Z_{w_0} \rho Z_{w_0}^\dagger] - Tr[(I - O_{w_1}^\dagger O_{w_1}) Z_{w_0} \rho Z_{w_0}^\dagger] + & \\
Tr[O_{w_0} \rho O_{w_0}^\dagger] - Tr[(I - Z_{w_1}^\dagger Z_{w_1}) O_{w_0} \rho O_{w_0}^\dagger] &\leq 1/2^{n-1}
\end{aligned}
$$

Using that $p_0 = Tr(Z_{w_0}^\dagger Z_{w_0} \rho)$ and $p_1 = Tr(O_{w_1}^\dagger O_{w_1} \rho)$ we get

$$
\begin{aligned}
p_0 + p_1 &\leq Tr[(I - O_{w_1}^\dagger O_{w_1}) Z_{w_0} \rho Z_{w_0}^\dagger] + Tr[(I - Z_{w_1}^\dagger Z_{w_1}) O_{w_0} \rho O_{w_0}^\dagger] + 1/2^{n-1} \\
p_0 + p_1 &\leq Tr[I - O_{w_1}^\dagger O_{w_1}] + Tr[I - Z_{w_1}^\dagger Z_{w_1}] + 1/2^{n-1} \\
p_0 + p_1 &\leq (1 - p_0) + (1 - p_1) + 1/2^{n-1} \\
2(p_0 + p_1) &\leq 2 + 1/2^{n-1} \\
p_0 + p_1 &\leq 1 + 1/2^n
\end{aligned}
$$

This last statement means that the probability of cheating the bit commitment scheme is only exponentially little better than in the honest case. This is the best we could hope for because this value is reached by Peggy-Paula acting nearly honestly: Peggy and Paula act honestly except that when Paula unveils if she wish to unveil the opposite bit to Peggy she sends a random string instead of w. With probability $1/2^n$ she succeeds in unveiling the opposite bit.

(9)

WARNING!

Oblivious Transfer (message multiplexing)



Oblivious Transfer (message multiplexing)



Brassard, Crépeau, Mayers, Salvail 97

Mutual Identification



x



y





x=y?

x=y?

Mutual Identification



x



y



x=y?

x=y?

SUCCESS!

Mutual Identification



FAILURE!

(10) Classical Multi-party Computing

Classical Multi-party Computing

- Network of n players
- Each has input x_i
- Want to compute $f(x_1,\ldots,x_n)$ for some known function f
- *E.g.* electronic voting



Classical Multi-party Computing

Even if *t* out of *n* players try to cheat:

1. Cheaters learn nothing (except output)

2. Cheaters cannot affect output (except by choice of input)



Results


IMPOSSIBLE
Classical MPC
(without broadcast)
VSS (without broadcast)
Classical MPC
(with broadcast)
VSS (with broadcast)
0
n/3
n/2
t = number of cheaters

(11) Multi-Party Quantum Computing

Multi-party Quantum Computing

- Players' inputs are quantum states
  - Possibly entangled
  - No description necessary (protocol is "oblivious")
- Output is quantum
- Want to evaluate a known quantum circuit U
- Player i gets i-th component of output



Multi-party Quantum Computing

- Players' inputs form an arbitrary state
  ρ in $H_1 \otimes H_2 \otimes \ldots \otimes H_n$
- Player i holds i-th component:
  ρ_i
- Each player gets one output:
  $\rho_i' = (U \rho U^\dagger)_i$



$\rho' = U \rho U^\dagger$

Multi-party Quantum Computing

Even if *t* out of *n*

players try to cheat:



1. Cheaters learn nothing
   (except output)
2. Cheaters cannot affect output
   (except by choice of inputs)

Results

- $t < n/6$:

  Any Multi-party Quantum Computation

- $t < n/4$:

  Verifiable Quantum Secret-Sharing

- $t \geq n/4$:

  Even (perfect) VQSS is impossible

Results



MPQC and Fault-Tolerant Computing

- MPQC is like FTQC with a different error model...

	FTQC	MPQC
Type of errors	randomly spread, independent	maliciously placed, entangled with data
Error location	Can occur anywhere	At most t positions

  - Similar protocol techniques:

    Classical MPC [BGW,CCD] → FTQC [AB99] → MPQC [CGS]

  - Different proof techniques

    (Need different notion of "proximity" to coding subspaces)

an Introduction to theoretical quantum CRYPTOGRAPHY

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