

# COMP 251 2016, Assignment 1

2. Either prove the following statement or exhibit a counter-example.

*The solutions produced by both algorithms are equal  
if and only if  
this is the only solution to the input instance.*

Two things have to be proved here:

A) (this is the easier part)

*If there is only one solution to the input instance  
then  
the solutions produced by both algorithms are equal.*

B) (this is the harder part)

*If the solutions produced by both algorithms are equal  
then  
this is the only solution to the input instance.*

And remember that by the contrapositive formulation the latter one is equivalent to

*If there are more than one solution to the input instance  
then  
the solutions produced by both algorithms must be distinct.*

A) Since we have already proved in class that both algorithms output a solution, if there is only one solution then they must both output that unique one.

B) If there is more than one solution then let  $M_0$  and  $M_1$  be two distinct stable matchings for the given input preference-lists and let  $M_0$  be the solution that is men-optimal. We will show that  $M_0$  cannot be women-optimal at the same time.

Take the men in some arbitrary order and select the first man  $m$  who is matched with a different woman in each of  $M_0$  and  $M_1$ . Let  $w_0$  and  $w_1$  be  $m$ 's matches in  $M_0$  and  $M_1$ . By the men-optimality of  $M_0$  we conclude that  $w_0$  is  $m$ 's preferred valid partner. Let  $m'$  be  $w_0$ 's partner in  $M_1$ . Since  $M_1$  is stable, it must be that  $w_0$  prefers  $m'$  to  $m$  (otherwise  $(w_0-m')$  would be unstable in  $M_1$ ). Now we know that both  $m$  and  $m'$  are valid partners of  $w_0$  but that  $w_0$  prefers  $m'$  to  $m$ . In consequence  $M_0$  cannot be women-optimal as well because  $w_0$  is not matched with her preferred valid partner ( $m$  is not her favorite valid partner). **QED**