


COMP-199

Introduction to Cryptography

Lecture 03

Claude Crépeau

School of Computer Science
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



Complexity


Theoretical

Cryptography

Complexity Theoretical Asymmetric Cryptography



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public key distribution

asymmetric encryption


asymmetric authentication

zero-knowledge identification

.....

public key
distribution

PUBLIC-KEY DISTRIBUTION



modular arithmetic

- $a+b \bmod n$

running time: $O(|n|)$

- $a*b \bmod n$

running time: $O(|n|^2)$

- $(+, *)$ field mod p

associative - commutative - distributive - inverses

- generators mod p

$\{g^1 \bmod p, g^2 \bmod p, \dots, g^{p-1} \bmod p\} = \{1, 2, \dots, p-1\}$

computing $a^e \bmod n$

```
expo(a,e,n: integer):integer
```

```
x := 1
```

```
WHILE e>0 DO
```

```
... IF e is odd THEN x := ax mod n
```

```
... a := a2 mod n
```

```
... e := e div 2
```

```
RETURN x
```

running time: $O(|n|^2 |e|)$

testing pseudo-primality

pseudo(a,n: integer):boolean

IF $\gcd(a,n) > 1$ THEN RETURN F

compute s,t such that $n-1 = t2^s$ (t odd)

$x := a^t \bmod n$; $y := 1$

WHILE $s > 0$ and $x > 1$ DO

... $y := x$; $x := x^2 \bmod n$; $s := s-1$

IF $x > 1$ or $1 < y < n-1$ THEN RETURN F

ELSE RETURN T

running time: $O(|n|^3)$


testing a generator

gen(g,p: integer):boolean


```
IF  $g^{p-1} \bmod p > 1$  THEN RETURN F
FOREACH q prime factor of  $p-1$  DO
... IF  $g^{p-1/q} \bmod p = 1$  THEN RETURN F
ELSE RETURN T
```

running time: $O(|n|^3 \log |n|)$ given the q's
density of generators $< p \approx p / \ln |p|$

PUBLIC-KEY DISTRIBUTION



p: prime
g: generator



$$x := g^a \bmod p$$

$$y := g^b \bmod p$$

x

y


$$k := y^a \bmod p$$

$$k := x^b \bmod p$$

$$((g^a)^b) = k = ((g^b)^a)$$


public key
encryption

asymmetric encryption (public-key cryptography)



Complexity Theoretical Security

PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY



RSA public-key cryptosystem

- $n = p * q$, two large primes
- e such that $\gcd(e, (p-1)(q-1))=1$
- d such that $e*d \equiv 1 \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$
- $K_e = (n, e)$, $K_d = (n, d)$
- **encryption** $E(m) : m^e \pmod{n}$
- **decryption** $D(c) : c^d \pmod{n}$


Various PKCS

- RSA: discret root extraction
- ElGamal: discret log
- Menez-Vanstone: elliptic curves
- McEliece: error correcting codes
- Blum-Goldwasser: factoring
- Ajtai-Dwork: lattice

**digital
signatures**


asymmetric authentication

(digital signature schemes)



Complexity Theoretical Security

Digital Signature



RSA digital signature scheme


- $n = p * q$, two large primes
- v such that $\gcd(v, (p-1)(q-1))=1$
- a such that $v^*a \equiv 1 \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$
- $K_a = (n, a)$, $K_v = (n, v)$
- **Authentication** $A(m): m^a \pmod{n}$
- **Verification** $V(m, t): m \equiv t^v \pmod{n}$

Various Digital Signatures

- RSA: discret root extraction
- ElGamal: discret log
- DSS: variant of ElGamal
- Chaum et al: undeniable sign.
- Pfitzman-Waidner: fail-stop sign.




Message Digest

(cryptographic hashing)



zero-knowledge
identification

off-line solution



COMP-199



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CIAO !

